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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH/ULC MONASTERY
d/b/a THE UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH,
UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY
STOREHOUSE, GEORGE FREEMAN, BRUCE TAYLOR,
CALVIN TOELLNER and DANIEL CHAPIN,

14 Civ. 5213 (NRB)

Defendants.
----------------------------------------X
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
connection

with

brings
its

this

trademark

registration

of

infringement
various

“Universal Church” and “The Universal Church.”

marks,

action

in

including

Plaintiff asserts

trademark infringement claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1114(1), 1125(a), claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and state law claims for
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and deceptive business
practices.

See First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15).

moved for summary judgment.

Both parties have

For the reasons set forth below, we

grant defendants’ motion and deny plaintiff’s motion.

In doing

so, we hold that “Universal Church” and “The Universal Church” are
generic marks and that, even if they were not, plaintiff could not
establish likelihood of confusion.

1
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BACKGROUND1
I.

Factual Background
A.

Parties

Plaintiff,

The

Universal

Pentecostal/Charismatic church.

Church,

Inc.,

is

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 2.

a
It

was incorporated in New York on May 5, 1987, as a not-for-profit
corporation and has its principal place of business in New Jersey.
Id. ¶ 1.

Plaintiff is spiritually affiliated with, but legally

independent of, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, a
Brazilian church founded in 1977.
5.

Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 3-

Plaintiff has “around 30,000 members,” while plaintiff’s

Brazilian affiliate has millions of members.

Zibas Decl. (ECF No.

91), Ex. B at 21:15-19; 144:23-25; see also Pl.’s Opp. MSJ (ECF
No. 113) at 16.2
Defendant Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse, Inc.
(“ULC”) was incorporated in Washington State on September 13, 2006,

The following is taken from the parties’ statements of material facts
pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 and is considered undisputed unless otherwise noted.
At oral argument, the parties confirmed that all material evidence had been
submitted in connection with the present motions and that no additional material
evidence would be presented if the case were to proceed to trial. See Oral
Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 23:7-15.
1

At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel disputed that plaintiff has “only”
30,000 members. Counsel claimed that the figure was “far more” but was unable
to provide an alternative figure. See Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 18:2119:6. Given that plaintiff’s own vice-president and 30(b)(6) witness affirmed
the 30,000 figure, see Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 at 21:15-19 (“Q How
many members do you have of [sic] The Universal Church, Inc., church members
[sic]? A We have around 30,000 members.”), and the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we take the figure as undisputed for summary judgment.
2

2
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as a not-for-profit corporation.
17.3

Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 16-

¶ 18.

Prior to that, ULC was an unincorporated association.

Id.

Defendant ULC describes itself as a “a non-denominational,

non-profit organization”

that “recogniz[es] the importance of

maintaining open hearts and minds, embracing any individual, no
matter his spiritual background, who wishes to become a member of
this family of faith.”
its members.

Id. ¶ 31.

Id. ¶ 30.

It offers free ordinations to

It is an offshoot of a church founded in

California in the 1950s that was initially called the “Universal
Church.”

Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 27.

There are other “Universal Life

Churches” that are offshoots of the original church but are not
affiliated with defendants.

Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.

Defendant Universal Life Church/ULC Monastery is affiliated
with defendant ULC.

Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 23:16-24:7.

The four individual defendants are current or former officers of
one of the corporate defendants.

Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶ 19.

3 Plaintiff responded to and/or disputed several statements in defendants’
56.1 statement by noting that it “lacks information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of this unverified assertion.” See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 (ECF
No. 114) ¶¶ 16-18, 22-23. We treat such statements as undisputed for purposes
of summary judgment. See S.D.N.Y. LR 56.1(c) (“Each numbered paragraph in the
statement of material facts . . . will be deemed to be admitted for purposes of
the motion unless specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered
paragraph in the statement required to be served by the opposing party.”); id.
56.1(d) (“Each statement by the . . . opponent . . . , including each statement
controverting any statement of material fact, must be followed by citation to
evidence which would be admissible . . . .”).

3
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B.

Trademarks at Issue

This

lawsuit

plaintiff:

involves

“Universal

three

Church,”

trademarks

“The

Universal

“Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.”4

registered

by

Church,”

and

Two of the marks——

”Universal Church” and “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God”——
were registered in January 2006.
47.

Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 38,

The marks were registered with the United States Patent and

Trademark

Office

ministerial
services.”

(the

“USPTO”)

services,

namely,

for

use

in

conducting

“evangelistic
religious

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 5(a), (b).

and

worship

The registration

certificates state that the marks were first used in commerce in
May 1987.

Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 39, 48.

In February 2012,

the USPTO issued Notices of Acceptance under Sections 8 and 15 of
the Lanham Act granting incontestable status to the marks.

Id.

¶¶ 41, 50.
The third mark, “The Universal Church,” was registered in
April 2012 and has not reached incontestable status.
46.

It

is

registered

for

use

in

“religious

Id. ¶¶ 43,

counseling

and

ministerial services,” “newsletters and informational brochures
all

about

religious

beliefs

and

practices,”

and

“t-shirts

Plaintiff’s motion papers reference a fourth mark, “The Universal Church
of the Kingdom of God,” registration number 3,930,709. See Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No.
103) ¶ 5(d) (emphasis added). Defendants object to its consideration since it
was not identified in the first amended complaint as a trademark at issue. In
any event, no such mark appears to exist. The mark that is registered under
number 3,930,709 is “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God,” without a
preceding “The.” See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 7.
4

4
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distributed in connection with religious groups.”

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF

No. 103) ¶ 5(c).
In 2009, defendants attempted to register “Universal Life
Church” and several similar marks.

The USPTO rejected the mark on

the grounds that there was a likelihood of confusion with other
registered applications, including “Universal Church” and “Life
Church.”

Although defendants were afforded the opportunity to

submit evidence and arguments in response, they instead choose to
abandon their applications.5
C.

Defendants’ Use of the Trademarks

Plaintiff claims that defendants use the trademarks at issue
in one of five general ways: (1) by registering domain names,
including universalchurch.org, containing the phrase “universal
church”;

(2)

by

using

the

“Universal

Church”

on

the

universalchurch.org website; (3) by using the “Universal Church”
in the website’s metadata so that the website’s name shows up as
“The Universal Church”

in search results;

(4) by

bidding on

advertising keywords, including “the universal church,” so that
defendants’ websites appear in Internet search engine ads; and (5)
by “hijacking” map-based searches so that defendants’ website is

5 Having found the parties’ submissions on this point lacking, we take
judicial notice of the defendants’ trademark applications, which are available
on the USPTO’s website, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov. See Rockland Exposition,
Inc. v. All. of Auto. Serv. Providers of N.J., 894 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), as amended (Sept. 19, 2012) (taking judicial notice of online
trademark registration information).

5
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associated with the location of plaintiff’s churches.

These uses

are explained in greater detail below.
1.

Registering Domain Names that Incorporate
“Universal Church”

Defendants registered 17 domain names containing the phrase
“universal church.”

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 18.

The domain

name that is central to this lawsuit is universalchurch.org, which
defendants registered in 2010.

Id. ¶ 24.6

The domain names were

all registered by defendants between 2009 and 2013.

Id. ¶¶ 21-

29.
2.

Use of “The Universal Church” on Defendants’
Websites

Defendants used the phrase “universal church” in various ways
on the website hosted at universalchurch.org.

For example, the

mark appears at the website’s top left corner and in the website’s
text, as shown below:

Defendants also registered universalchurch.co, universalchurch.info,
universalchurch.mobi, universalchurch.mx, universalchurch.net,
theuniversalchurch.org, universalchurchoflife.org, universalchurchonline.com,
universalchurchonline.net, univeralchurchonline.org,
universalchurchsupplies.com, universalchurchsupplies.net,
universalchurchsupplies.org, universalchurchsupply.com,
universalchurchsupply.net, universalchurchsupply.org. See Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No.
102) at 7 n.2.
6

6
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Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 36 (screenshot of universalchurch.org
homepage

taken

on

January

5,

2014);

see

also

id.

¶¶

31-33

(screenshots and descriptions of website’s content on different
dates).

At various times, the website also included a link to

defendants’ website, themonastery.org, through which defendants
offer online ordination services.

Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiff also claims that the website contained “defamatory
content” about the founder of the Universal Church of the Kingdom
of God, id. ¶ 40, and explained that “‘Universal Church’ is a
registered trademark. The sponsor of this website is the Universal

7
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Life Church, unaffiliated with the legally recognized trademark
holder, ‘Universal Church, Inc.,’” id. ¶ 31.7
3.

Use of “The Universal Church” in Website
Metadata

Defendants have also used “The Universal Church” as the “title
tag” in the HTML metadata for universalchurch.org.

The effect is

that a search result for the website appears as follows:

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 40 (screenshot of partial Google search
result).
4.

Bidding on “Universal Church” as a Keyword
Search Term

Plaintiff next claims that defendants bid on certain keyword
search terms in order to place “pay-per-click” ads.8

Pl.’s 56.1

7 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s screenshots of the universalchurch.org
website, which are taken from archive.org’s Wayback Machine, have not been
authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901. However, plaintiff submitted
with its reply an affidavit from an archive.org employee, see Daniels Decl.
(ECF No. 125), Ex. 1, which courts in this Circuit have generally accepted as
sufficient for authentication purposes, see, e.g., Foster v. Lee, 93 F. Supp.
3d 223, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Mahmood v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. 11 CIV.
5345 KBF, 2012 WL 242836, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012). In addition,
courts have taken judicial notice of screenshots taken from the Wayback Machine
under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See, e.g., Distributorsoutlet.com, LLC v.
Glasstree, Inc., No. 11-CV-6079(PKC)(SLT), 2016 WL 3248310, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
June 10, 2016).
8 Search engines such as Google generally return two types of search
results: “organic” results and ads. Organic results are those that the search
engine’s algorithm believes are most relevant to the particular search. Ads,
in contrast, are bought by bidding on a particular keyword, such that an ad
appears above the organic search results when someone searches for that keyword.

8
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(ECF No. 103) ¶ 43.

Defendants do not dispute that they bid on

the phrase “the universal church,” but do dispute that they bid on
“universal church” and “universal church of the kingdom of god.”
Def.’s Opp. 56.1 (ECF No. 121) ¶ 43.9
5.

“Hijacking” Location-Based Search Results

Finally, plaintiff claims that the search results for its
physical church locations in location-based search engines have
become associated with defendants’ websites, a process known as
“hijacking.”

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶¶ 46-48.

For example,

plaintiff claims that the Google Maps search result for its church
at 1077 Southern Boulevard in the Bronx was linked to defendants’
website, themonastery.org, as shown below:

9 Plaintiff relies on the testimony of an employee of the company that
optimized defendants’ search optimization strategy.
The employee was asked
whether the list of words that defendants bid on “include[s] Universal Church,
The Universal Church, or the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.” Zibas
Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. BB at 17:21-24 (emphasis added). The employee responded
affirmatively, but given the disjunctive framing of the question, it is not
clear whether he was testifying that defendants had bid on all three marks or
at least one mark. The employee later did clarify that defendants had bid on
at least “the universal church.” Id. at 20:4-6.

9
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Id. ¶ 47.

Plaintiff’s expert claims to have found 290 such

instances.

Id. ¶ 46.

However, the parties dispute whether

defendants are responsible for the hijacking and whether any such
hijacking is attributable to defendants’ “use” of the trademarks
in question.

Compare Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 46, with Def.’s

Opp. 56.1 (ECF No. 121) ¶ 46.
II.

Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed suit on July 11, 2014, see Compl. (ECF No.

2), and filed its first amended complaint on November 18, 2015,
see First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15).
asserts

three

types

of

claims:

The first amended complaint

(1)

that

defendants’

use

of

plaintiff’s trademarks constitutes trademark infringement under
the

Lanham

Act,

15

U.S.C.

§§

1114(1)

and

1125(a);

(2)

that

defendants’ registration of certain domain names violates the
federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d); (3) that defendants have engaged in deceptive business
practices in violation of Sections 349 and 350 of the New York
General Business Law; and (4) that defendants’ conduct constitutes
trademark infringement and unfair competition under New York state
common law.

See id.

Defendants answered the first amended complaint on January
12, 2015, and also brought counterclaims seeking (1) a declaratory
judgment

that

plaintiff’s

trademarks

are

invalid

and

unenforceable; (2) cancellation of the marks; and (3) a declaratory
10
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judgment

that

defendants

have

not

trademarks even if they are valid.

infringed

plaintiff’s

See Answer (ECF No. 24).

Both parties moved for summary judgment.
92.

on

See ECF Nos. 84,

2017,

We heard oral argument on the parties’ motions on July 11,
and

allowed

supplemental briefs.

both

parties

to

file

post-oral

argument

See ECF Nos. 133, 137.
DISCUSSION

I.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

Fed. R. Civ.

“A fact is ‘material’ when it might affect the outcome

of the suit under governing law.”

McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet

Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

A genuine dispute exists if a reasonable factfinder

could decide in the nonmoving party’s favor.

Id.

A court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable
factual inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v.

The moving party

must “make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary
judgment.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986).

If the moving party puts forth such a showing, the party opposing
summary judgment must then present “sufficient evidence favoring

11
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the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249.
II.

Federal Trademark Claims
Plaintiff asserts federal trademark infringement claims under

Sections

1114(1)

and

§§ 1114(1), 1125(a).

1125(a)

of

the

Lanham

Act,

15

U.S.C.

We analyze claims brought under either

provision by applying a well-established two-prong test:

We

determine, “first . . . whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled
to protection, and second . . . whether defendant’s use of the
mark is likely to cause consumers confusion as to the origin or
sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.”

Virgin Enterps. Ltd. v.

Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003).
A.

“Universal Church” Is Generic and Not Entitled to
Trademark Protection10

Defendants
entitled

to

first

protection

argue

that

because

it

“Universal
is

a

Church”

generic

is

rather

not
than

descriptive mark.
1.

Standard

Potential trademarks are divided into five categories of
distinctiveness that reflect the degree, in ascending order, to
which they are eligible to be trademarked and protected: (1)

10 Defendants conceded at
whether “Universal Church of the
(ECF No. 138) at 2:7-10. Given
and “Universal Church” marks,
otherwise.

oral argument that they are not contesting
Kingdom of God” is generic. See Oral Arg. Tr.
the similarity between “The Universal Church”
we treat them interchangeably unless noted

12
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generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5)
fanciful.

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537

F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).11

As the Second Circuit has noted,

however, “[t]he lines of demarcation . . . are not always bright.”
Id.
“A descriptive mark describes a product’s features, qualities
or ingredients in ordinary language, or describes the use to which
a product is put.”

Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124

F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted).

Such a mark “may be registered only if the

registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it
has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” Park
‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985);
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f).

The USPTO “may accept as prima facie

evidence that the mark has become distinctive . . . proof of
substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by
the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on
which the claim of distinctiveness is made.”

15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).

In contrast, a “generic mark is generally a common description
of goods, one that refers, or has come to be understood as
referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a

11 The last three categories, which are inapplicable here, are “‘inherently
distinctive,’ and are automatically entitled to protection under the Lanham
Act.” Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.
1997).

13
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species.” Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 143 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citations omitted).

“Generic names use common

words that are synonymous with the nature of the organization.”
Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc’y, Inc., 694 F.
Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

In other words, a generic mark

is one that answers the question “What are you?” while a valid
trademark answers “Who are you?”

See 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and

Unfair Competition § 12:1 (4th ed.). “Because they serve primarily
to describe products rather than identify their sources, generic
terms are incapable of becoming trademarks, at least in connection
with the products that they designate.”

Bos. Duck Tours, LP v.

Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008).
“Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may
be canceled at any time on the grounds that it [is] generic.”
‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193-94; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

Park

A mark

may be cancelled regardless of whether the USPTO has deemed it
“incontestable.”

See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 195.12

To determine whether a mark is generic, the Lanham Act directs
courts

to

consider

“relevant public.”

the

mark’s

“primary

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

significance”

to

the

Thus, a “mark is not

generic merely because it has some significance to the public as

12 A registrant’s right to use a mark is deemed “incontestable” if, after
the mark has been registered for five years, the registrant files an affidavit
with the USPTO stating, among other things, that the registrant’s use of the
mark has been continuous for five years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065.

14
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an indication of the nature or class of an article.

In order to

become generic the principal significance of the word must be its
indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than an
indication of its origin.”

Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 144

(internal quotation marks omitted).13
“Types of evidence to be considered in determining whether a
mark is generic include: (1) dictionary definitions; (2) generic
use of the term by competitors and other persons in the trade; (3)
plaintiff’s own generic use; (4) generic use in the media; and (5)
consumer surveys.”

Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120

F. Supp. 2d 286, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Tiffany & Co. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 994 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
2.

Burden

As an initial matter, the parties dispute who bears the
ultimate burden of proving that “Universal Church” is generic.
Although the party seeking to enforce a trademark generally
bears the burden of establishing that it has a valid trademark,
registering a mark creates a presumption of validity.

See Reese

Pub. Co. v. Hampton Int’l Commc’ns, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir.
1980).

That presumption, however, only extends to the class of

products and services listed in the registration statement.

See

13 The test for genericness is the same whether a mark becomes generic or
is generic ab initio. See Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 144.

15
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Gameologist Grp., LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d
141, 153–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he presumption of an exclusive
right to use a registered mark extends only to the goods and
services noted in a registration certificate.”), aff’d, 508 F.
App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2013).

Therefore, the question of who bears the

burden turns on whether plaintiff is attempting to enforce its
trademark within the class of services for which it was registered.
The

“Universal

“evangelistic

and

Church”

trademark

ministerial

religious worship services.”

services,

is

registered

namely

for

conducting

We interpret this class broadly,14

and find that defendants’ use of the trademark falls within it.15
While it is true that defendants are not a traditional church,
their core business is ordaining ministers, which is a “ministerial

14 Beyond the expansive language used in the class definition, a broad
interpretation is supported by the fact that plaintiff’s counsel disclaimed
that the word “evangelistic” limited the class’s scope. Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No.
138) at 4:13-24. Moreover, plaintiff has attempted to enforce its trademarks
against a wide range of religious (and apparently even some non-religious)
organizations, suggesting that it also interprets the class broadly.
See
Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 4 (cease-and-desist letters sent to, among
others, The Universal Church, Inc., One Life Universal Church, Universal Church
of Metaphysics, Inc., Universal Church of God, Inc., Universal Church of
Fellowship, American Universal Church, Inc., First Universal Church of
Knowledge, Universal Church of God in Christ, Inc., Universal Church of Truth
Consciousness, Universal Church of Baba’s Kitchen, Inc., Maxam Universal Church,
Pentecostal Universal Church, The Universal Church of God Inc., Universal Church
of Salvation, Universal Church of God, Universal Church of the Living God,
Universal Church of God and Action, Universal Church of God and Christ,
Universal Church of God in Christ, Inc., Universal Church of Jesus Christ,
Universal Church of Olodumare, Inc., Universal Church of Christ, Inc., The
Universal Church of Mind-Body Enlightenment, and The Universal Church Assembly
of First-Born).
15 We find the same with respect to “The Universal Church” mark, which is
registered for use in “religious counseling and ministerial services,” among
other things. Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 5(c).

16

Case 1:14-cv-05213-NRB Document 141 Filed 08/08/17 Page 17 of 46

service.”

See “Ordain,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

(10th ed. 1996) (defining “ordain” as “to invest officially . . .
with ministerial or priestly authority”).

Accordingly, plaintiff

is entitled to a presumption of validity, i.e., that its “Universal
Church” mark is not generic.
3.

Application

Despite this presumption, we find that “universal” is generic
as applied to churches.
dispute.16

The following facts are not genuinely in

First, defendants presented evidence that “universal”

is understood as referring to the entire Christian Church or all
Christians

collectively.

For

example,

the

Oxford

English

Dictionary includes a definition of “universal” as “[d]esignating
the whole Christian Church or all Christians collectively; =

16 In considering the evidence, we keep in mind that test for genericness
is the mark’s primary significance to the “relevant public.”
15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(3).
Since plaintiff has registered the mark for “evangelistic and
ministerial services, namely, conducting religious worship services,” the
relevant public is extremely broad and includes all those who seek out and
provide religious worship services, including all Christians.
We therefore
reject plaintiff’s argument that the relevant public should be construed
narrowly as only Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians. See Pl.’s Supp. Mem.
(ECF No. 133) at 4 n.6; cf. Pl.’s Opp. MSJ (ECF No. 113) at 8, 21.

The parties also dispute whether “consumer” surveys are relevant to the
question of genericness.
While the relevant public here does not include
“consumers” as that word is used in sense of a commercial product or service,
we see no reason why the parties could not have conducted surveys of how the
relevant public understands plaintiff’s mark.
Nevertheless, the failure to
produce a survey is not fatal, especially since defendants claim that the mark
was generic ab initio. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (consumers surveys not necessary to establish
“the meaning of a familiar English word”); Horizon Mills Corp. v. Qvc, Inc.,
161 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (where “the term was generic before
the seller used it,” “[a]n individual challenging the mark need only establish
that the term is generic through an examination of the term itself”).

17
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CATHOLIC . . . Freq. in universal church.”
91), Ex. N.

Zibas Decl. (ECF No.

As the dictionary notes, “universal” in this sense

has a similar meaning to “catholic,” id., which is simply the
transliteration of the Greek word for “universal,” “καθολικός” or
“katholikos.”

“Catholic,” Oxford English Dictionary Online (June

2017).
While

the

parties

disagree

on

how

widespread

this

understanding is, they agree that it is well-established within
the Roman Catholic Church and that at least some non-Catholics
understand and use the term in this sense.

See Zibas Decl. (ECF

No. 91), Ex. R at 30 (“[T]he phrase ‘Universal Church’ is a
standard, hallowed usage in the Catholic Church as well as in many
other Churches to refer to the Church as a world-wide reality.”);
Irvin Decl. (ECF No. 96), Ex. A at 9 (“[The term ‘universal
church’] refers specifically to the Roman Catholic Church in
Catholic teachings, and is part of the claim made in official Roman
Catholic theology that other churches or communions are not even
‘churches’ in a proper sense.”); id. at 5 (recognizing “occasional”
use of the term by Lutherans and Methodists); see also Def.’s 56.1
(ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 75-76.17

17 To the extent that plaintiff argues that a word’s historic use is
irrelevant to whether it is generic, plaintiff is wrong.
See, e.g., Harley
Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1999) (examining
historic use of “hog” in finding that it was generic as applied to motorcycles);
E. Air Lines, Inc. v. N.Y. Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (analyzing historic use of “shuttle” in finding that it was generic).

18
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Moreover, “universal” has been used in this sense for hundreds
of years, and even thousands of years if the original Latin and
Greek versions are considered.

See Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex.

N; see generally id., Ex. R.
Second, defendants presented evidence that numerous churches
use “universal” and “universal church” in their name.
56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶¶ 87-89.

See Def.’s

For example, defendants’ search of

organizations registered to do business in New York shows that the
“Universal Church of the Spirit, Inc.” was registered in 1935, the
“Universal Church of God, Fire Baptized, Inc.” was registered in
1945, the “Universal Church of Christ” was registered in 1980, the
“Universal Church Development Corp.” was registered in 1981, and
the “Universal Church of Life” was registered in 1997.
Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. X.

See Zibas

Similarly, defendants’ search of

organizations registered to do business in California shows that
“The Universal Church of the New Birth” was registered in 1966,
the “Universal Church of God and Institute of Applied Religious
Sciences” was registered in 1983, and the “Universal Church of
Religious Freedom” was registered in 1989.
is exhaustive.

See id.

Neither list

Defendants produced similar search results for

Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,

19

Case 1:14-cv-05213-NRB Document 141 Filed 08/08/17 Page 20 of 46

and

Pennsylvania,

identifying

almost

100

active

entities using “universal church” in their names.

or

inactive

Id.18

Third, “universal” is used in the name of the denomination,
Unitarian Universalism, see Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶ 62, while
“universal’s” etymological counterpart, “catholic,” is used in the
name of the largest Christian denomination, the Roman Catholic
Church.
In contrast, there is little evidence that the relevant public
understands “Universal Church” as referring to plaintiff, despite
the fact that the USPTO registered the mark as having achieved
secondary
status.

meaning

and

subsequently

granted

it

incontestable

For example, plaintiff claims that it uses the mark in

connection with its 230 physical locations and weekly broadcasts
that reach 800,000 people.
11.

See Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶¶ 7, 9-

This claim is based largely on the testimony from plaintiff’s

own employees.

See, e.g., Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 at

83:19-84:2 (“[W]e promote this brand, this name all over the media,
our locations, even in front of each location of ours.

We always

try to promote the name of the church and the buildings we own and
we lease.

I would say that the Universal Church is pretty much

known as the church as we are.”); id., Ex. 12 at 38:19-21 (“[W]e

18 Plaintiff’s argument that there is no evidence that these entities are
recognized by consumers or use “universal church” in commerce, see Pl.’s Opp.
MSJ (ECF No. 113) at 18, is undermined by the fact that plaintiff sent ceaseand desist letters to similar organizations, see supra n.13.
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use

[‘Universal

Church’]

when

we

evangelize,

when

we

have

brochures, flyers, newspapers, tee shirts.”); id. at 39:2-10 (“I
believe that when you use the words Universal Church, everyone
thinks of us.

Q. And what makes you say that?

Universal Church, everybody knows it as us.

A. Just because,

That’s the name we

use when we do advertising, when we do T.V. programs, it’s all
over the place and has been in the United States since 1987.”).19
However,
because

“little

probative

“[t]rademark

law

value”

is

attaches

skeptical

of

to
the

such

testimony

ability

of

an

associate of a trademark holder to transcend personal biases to
give an impartial account of the value of the holder’s mark.”
Self-Realization

Fellowship

Church

v.

Ananda

Church

of

Self-

Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Jewish
Sephardic Yellow Pages, Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d
340, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same).20

Apart from the newsletter discussed below, plaintiff submitted no
documentary evidence showing that it uses the “Universal Church” mark on
brochures, flyers, newspapers, or tee shirts.
19

20 Much of the testimony that plaintiff cites is also irrelevant because
it does not specifically address plaintiff’s use of the “Universal Church” mark
or distinguish between plaintiff’s use of “Universal Church” versus “Universal
Church of the Kingdom of God.” See, e.g., Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11
at 21:5-14 (“Q Is there more than one location? A Yes Q How many locations
does The Universal Church, Inc. have?
A We have around 230.
Q Are those
locations all in the U.S.? A Yes.”); see also id. at 29:22-32:18, 30:11-32:18,
34:9-36:4, 47:13-18, 72:14-22, 83:12-84:2, 86:20-23; id., Ex. 13 at 23:7-13,
43:6-44:9.
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There is also little documentary evidence to support the
claim.

Plaintiff submitted the below photograph, which shows “The

Universal Church” mark on one of its churches:

See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 15.21 Plaintiff also submitted
a newsletter that it publishes called “Universal News,” which
contains sporadic references to the “Universal Church” in the text
and a Facebook link to “Like us: The Universal Church”:

21 Plaintiff submitted three other photographs of its church fronts, but
one of the photographs is indiscernible and the other two use the Spanish
version of the “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God” name rather than
“Universal Church.” See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 15.

22
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See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 8.
Plaintiff was also unable to substantiate its claim that its
weekly broadcast reach 800,000 figure, see Zibas Decl. (ECF No.

23
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117), Ex. A at 2 (letter from plaintiff’s counsel to defense
counsel noting that plaintiff was
documentation [regarding

“not aware of any written

the weekly viewership of plaintiff’s

services] at this time”), a figure that appears high given that
plaintiff only has approximately 30,000 U.S. members.
But even if we were to accept plaintiff’s claim that plaintiff
uses the “Universal Church” mark in connection with its physical
churches and broadcasts, it does little to show how the mark is
understood by the vast majority of the “relevant public” who do
not

belong

to

plaintiff’s

church.

With

respect

to

those

individuals, the only evidence in plaintiff’s favor appears to be
two articles referring to plaintiff as the “Universal Church.”

See

Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. EE (N.Y. Post article); Daniels Decl.
(ECF No. 123), Ex. 23 (N.Y. Times article).22

Thus, we find that

there is virtually no evidence in the record that anyone in the
relevant public, outside plaintiff’s own members, understands
“Universal Church” as referring to plaintiff.

22 Again, the record contains numerous other articles that are irrelevant,
either because they do not use the “Universal Church” name or because they refer
to plaintiff’s Brazilian affiliate rather than plaintiff. See Zibas Decl. (ECF
No. 91), Ex. EE; Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 6. Likewise, plaintiff points
to an entry in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic
Movements for the “Universal Church of The Kingdom of God” that uses the
shorthand “Universal Church” to refer to the subject of the article. See
Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 123), Ex. 17. But as plaintiff concedes, the entry
describes plaintiff’s Brazilian affiliate, not plaintiff. See Pl.’s Opp. MSJ
(ECF No. 113) at 5.
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Based on this record, we hold that the primary significance
of “universal church” to the relevant public is a type of church
rather than plaintiff, namely one that considers itself to be
universal in the sense of representing the entire Christian church.
See Self-Realization Fellowship Church, 59 F.3d at 909-10 (finding
that “Self–Realization Fellowship Church” was generic because the
“evidence suggests that a ‘Self-realization’ organization is a
class of organization dedicated to spiritual attainment in the
manner

taught

by

Yoga,

not

an

organization

that

is

part

of

[plaintiff’s] chain of churches”); see also Rudolph Int’l, Inc. v.
Realys, Inc., 482 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Our review of
the record amply supports the district court’s conclusions [that
‘disinfectable’ as applied to nail files is generic]. The district
court correctly found that the term ‘disinfectable’ has a history
of established use as a generic adjective within the nail care
industry as well as in other fields such as medicine and dentistry.
For example, the district court noted that ‘disinfectable’ is
included in at least 25 patents issued since 2001.”); Miller
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th
Cir. 1977) (finding that “light” had “been widely used in the beer
industry for many years” to describe certain beer characteristics,
that such use “long antedated” plaintiff’s, and concluding that
“even if Miller had given its light beer a characteristic not found
in other light beers, it could not acquire the exclusive right to
25
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use the common descriptive word ‘light’ as a trademark for that
beer”).23
In reaching this holding, we are guided by the policies behind
trademark law.

See E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper Labs.,

Inc., 536 F. Supp. 523, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[W]hether a term is
generic or descriptive as applied to a particular article should
be

resolved

by

reference

to

the

policies

for

refusing

any

protection to some terms . . . .”).
By their very nature, trademarks give holders a monopoly over
the right to use certain terms in describing their products or
services.

However, trademark law is not intended to create

a monopoly over a particularly effective marketing
phrase. Instead the law grants a monopoly over a phrase
only if and to the extent it is necessary to enable
consumers to distinguish one producer’s goods from
others and even then only if the grant of such a monopoly
will not substantially disadvantage competitors by
preventing them from describing the nature of their
goods. Accordingly, if a term is necessary to describe
a product characteristic that a competitor has a right
to copy, a producer may not effectively preempt
competition by claiming that term as its own.

23 The fact that “Universal” does not name a religion is not dispositive.
Although some courts have applied such a test, see Gen. Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 413 (6th Cir. 2010); TE-TA-MA
Truth Found.--Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 666
(7th Cir. 2002), there are many ways to classify a church other than by the
religion it practices. For example, “Spanish church” would surely be generic
as describing a category of Spanish-language churches, even though there is no
denomination known as the “Spanish Church.” Cf. GMT Prods., L.P. v. Cablevision
of N.Y. City, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 207, 210-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the
“Arabic Channel,” as a channel broadcasting in Arabic, was generic).
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Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 144 (quoting A.J. Canfield Co. v.
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986)); see also CES Pub.
Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975)
(“To allow trademark protection for generic terms, i.e., names
which describe the genus of goods being sold, even when these have
become identified with a first user, would grant the owner of the
mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe his goods
as what they are.”); cf. Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80-81
(“Other brewers whose beers have qualities that make them ‘light’
as that word has commonly been used remain free to call their beer
‘light.’

Otherwise

a

manufacturer

could

remove

a

common

descriptive word from the public domain by investing his goods
with an additional quality, thus gaining the exclusive right to
call

his

wine

‘rosé,’

his

whiskey

‘blended,’

or

his

bread

‘white.’”).
Here, finding that “universal church” is generic would grant
plaintiff a monopoly over the word “universal” as used in church
names, a monopoly which plaintiff has already indicated that it
would enforce aggressively.

See supra n.13 (listing cease-and-

desist letters sent by plaintiff).

We are persuaded that the

trademark law is simply not intended to allow the mark to be
weaponized by plaintiff in this way.24

Plaintiff argues that if “universal” is generic as applied to churches,
then the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church, and the Catholic Church
24
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Finally, we note that our holding does not turn on the fact
that plaintiff is a non-profit church rather than a for-profit
company.

As the parties agreed at oral argument, there is no

separate trademark law that applies to non-profits or religious
organizations.

See Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 14:19-24.

And

as plaintiff points out, church names frequently receive trademark
protection.

See Pl.’s Supp. Mem. (ECF No. 133) at 4 n.5.

However,

even a cursory examination of the church names that have been
registered

reveals

“Universal Church.”
B.

that

they

are

far

more

distinctive

than

Id.25

There Is No Likelihood of Confusion

Even if we were to find that “Universal Church” is descriptive
rather than generic, plaintiff’s trademark claims would still fail
because no reasonable juror could find a likelihood of confusion.
1.

Standard

To prevail on its federal trademark claims, plaintiff must
show that there is a likelihood of confusion as to the origin or
sponsorship of defendants’ services.

Virgin Enters. Ltd., 335

must also be generic names. Whatever the merits of that argument, we need not
and, indeed, cannot decide it on the record before us.
Examples of church names that have been trademarked include the Church
of Religion of God, Divine Church of God, The World’s Church of the Living God,
Church of God Ministry of Jesus Christ, The United States Church, The Lord of
the Universe Church, The Church of Good Karma, Church of God in Christ, Living
Church of God, True Jesus Church, Church of the King, Christ’s Sanctified Holy
Church, The Episcopal Church, New Apostolic Church, and United Church of God
and Worldwide Church of God. See Pl.’s Supp. Mem. at 4 n.5.
25

28

Case 1:14-cv-05213-NRB Document 141 Filed 08/08/17 Page 29 of 46

F.3d at 146.
likelihood

Likelihood of confusion exists when “there is any

that

an

appreciable

number

of

ordinarily

prudent

purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as
to the source of the goods in question.”

Mushroom Makers, Inc. v.

R. G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, we
apply

the

Friendly

multi-factor
in

Polaroid

balancing

test

Corporation

v.

articulated
Polarad

Corporation, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).

by

Judge

Electronics

See New Kayak Pool

Corp. v. R&P Pools, Inc., 246 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2001).

The

Polaroid factors are (1) the strength of the mark; (2) evidence of
actual confusion; (3) the sophistication of the relevant public;
(4) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (5) the
proximity of the services; (6) the likelihood that the prior owner
will bridge the gap between its services and defendants’; (7)
defendants’ bad faith; and (8) the quality of defendants’ services.
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing confusion
at trial.
606

See Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, 910 F. Supp. 2d 591,

(S.D.N.Y.

probability

is

2012)
the

(“Generally
plaintiff’s

speaking,

burden,

establishing

which

means

that

that
the

defendant typically does not need to disprove a likelihood of
confusion.” (footnotes omitted)).
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“Summary judgment based on likelihood of confusion under the
Polaroid analysis is appropriate where the undisputed evidence
would lead only to one conclusion.”

Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Walgreen

Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

The issue “is not how many factors favor each

side but whether a reasonable trier of fact might differ as to
likelihood of confusion.”
2.

Id.

Strength of Plaintiff’s Trademark

Even if we were to find that “Universal Church” is descriptive
rather than generic, we would still find it to be a weak mark.
“When determining whether a . . . descriptive mark is a strong
one for purposes of the Polaroid inquiry, we look to the secondary
meaning that the mark has acquired.”

The Sports Auth., Inc. v.

Prime Hosp. Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1996).

“Secondary

meaning attaches when the name and the business have become
synonymous in the mind of the public, submerging the primary
meaning of the term in favor of its meaning as a word identifying
that business.”
390

(2d

Cir.

Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384,
1995)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

In

determining whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts
have considered (1) length and exclusivity of use; (2) advertising
expenditures; (3) consumer studies linking the product to product
source; (4) sales success; (5) unsolicited media coverage of the
product; (6) attempts to plagiarize.
30
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Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985).
has

achieved

incontestable

status,

Even where a mark

“independent

indicia

of

strength [are] relevant to deciding whether the strength of the
mark

weighs

in

favor

or

confusion under Polaroid.”

against

a

finding

of

likelihood

of

The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 961.

We find that there is little evidence that “Universal Church”
has acquired a strong secondary meaning as referring to plaintiff.
As discussed above, plaintiff has neither used the mark exclusively
nor as long as many other churches; the phrase “universal church”
has been used for millennia to refer to the entire Christian
Church or Christian community, as well as in the name of numerous
other churches; “universal” is used in the name of the Christian
denomination, Unitarian Universalism; and the word’s etymological
counterpart, “catholic,” is used in the name of Christianity’s
most populous religion.

See supra at 17-20.

In contrast, plaintiff has only been using the mark since
1987, only has 30,000 members, and there is little evidence in the
record that anyone outside plaintiff’s church refers to it as the
“Universal Church.”

See supra at 21-25.

With respect to media coverage, we noted above that there are
only two articles in the record that refer to plaintiff by the
“Universal Church” name, while the remaining articles in the record
either refer to plaintiff by its longer name or to plaintiff’s
Brazilian affiliate.

See supra at 25.
31
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None of the remaining factors to be considered in analyzing
secondary meaning are helpful to plaintiff.

There is no evidence

in the record regarding plaintiff’s advertising expenditures.
Def.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 87) ¶ 138.

Nor is there any evidence that

plaintiff’s mark has been widely plagiarized.
(ECF No. 113) at 19-20.26

See

See Pl.’s Opp. MSJ

Although plaintiff claims that it

occasionally publishes and sells books, audiovisual materials, and
other items incidental to its ministry, see Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 (ECF
No. 114) ¶ 6, there does not appear to be any evidence of the
amount of such sales or that the materials use the “Universal
Church” mark.

Finally, while plaintiff conducted a survey, the

survey was intended to measure confusion rather than whether the
relevant

public

plaintiff.

associates

the

“Universal

Church”

mark

with

See Cornerstone Decl. (ECF No. 114), Ex. A at 6; Pl.’s

Opp. 56.1 (ECF No. 114) ¶ 127 (“People were told that they were
looking for information about a church called ‘The Universal
Church’ even if they had no prior knowledge of Plaintiff.”).
Accordingly, we find that the “Universal Church” mark is
weak.27

26 Plaintiff argues that defendants’ conduct at issue here constitutes an
instance of plagiarism. See Pl.’s Opp. MSJ (ECF No. 113) at 19-20. However,
as discussed below in the context of whether defendants acted in bad faith, see
infra at II.B.7, we find that there is little evidence that defendants
intentionally copied plaintiff’s mark.
Moreover, a single example hardly
constitutes widespread plagiarizing.
27
As a result, the USPTO should not have registered the mark or
subsequently granted it incontestable status.
See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at
193-94 (A “descriptive” mark “may be registered only if the registrant shows
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3.

Evidence of Actual Confusion

Although

plaintiff

claims

that

there

is

“overwhelming”

evidence of actual confusion, we find that there is little to none
in the record. At most, plaintiff’s evidence suggests that someone
searching the Internet for “universal church” will sometimes land
on defendants’ website.

However, the evidence generally fails to

establish (1) that this occurs because of defendants’ use of the
“Universal Church” mark or (2) that individuals searching for
“universal church” are actually searching for plaintiff.
importantly,
defendants’

there

is

ordination

no

evidence

services

was

that

anyone

confused

by

More

purchasing
defendants’

alleged use of “Universal Church.”
Plaintiff’s evidence consists of a survey, testimony from its
30(b)(6) witness and plaintiff’s expert, and a Facebook message.
Plaintiff’s survey attempts to measure the extent to which someone
googling “the universal church” would believe that he had landed
on a website for an entity called “The Universal Church.”
Cornerstone Decl. (ECF No. 114), Ex. A.

See

However, we find the

survey of limited value since the survey takers were simply told
that they were searching for a generic entity named “The Universal

that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods in commerce.” (emphasis added)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)
(The USPTO “may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become
distinctive . . . proof of substantially exclusive . . . use thereof as a mark
by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the
claim of distinctiveness is made.” (emphasis added)).
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Church,” without any attempt to measure whether the survey takers
associated such an entity with plaintiff.

See id.; Pl.’s Opp.

56.1 (ECF No. 114) ¶ 127.
Plaintiff’s vice president and 30(b)(6) witness testified
that “many” of its pastors and members “had a hard time trying to
reach our correct Web site while they were searching for our
domain.”

See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 11 at 69:9-14; id.

at 72:22-73:4.28

As an initial matter, the testimony is entitled

to little weight since it comes from defendants’ vice-president,
an interested party.

See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian

Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Evidence of secondary meaning from a partial source possesses
very limited probative value.”); Jewish Sephardic Yellow Pages,
Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 340, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(same).
that

Moreover, such testimony is simply too vague to establish

anyone

was

actually

confused

between

the

services

that

plaintiff and defendants offered or that such confusion resulted
from defendants’ use of plaintiff’s trademarks, as opposed to, for

28 Defendants argue that the testimony is inadmissible hearsay.
However,
the Second Circuit has permitted testimony describing other individuals’
confusion in trademark cases on the grounds that the testimony is not being
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show the consumers’
state of mind. See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993,
1003-04 (2d Cir. 1997).
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example,

defendants’

non-infringing

search

optimization

strategies.29
Plaintiff also points to a message that it received on its
Facebook page from an individual who mistakenly believed that he
had been ordained by plaintiff in 1972, well before plaintiff’s
church was in operation.
Decl.

(ECF

No.

104),

Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 52; Daniels

Ex.

13

at

41:13-42:16.

However,

the

individual did not say who he believed he had been ordained by,
and therefore it is impossible to know whether his confusion even
involves defendants.
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendants’ expert found five
instances of actual confusion and testified that he could find a
“much, much, much, much, much higher number” if given additional
time.

See Daniels Decl. (ECF No. 104), Ex. 18 at 80:15-18.

However, contrary to plaintiff’s characterization, the expert was
describing

instances

where

individuals

“refer[red]

defendants by the misnomer Universal Church.”

to

the

Id. at 78:15-80:18;

see also Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. CC at 22 (“There are several

29 Such confusion might be relevant to “initial interest confusion,”
something neither party addressed in their briefing. See Savin Corp. v. Savin
Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[Initial interest confusion]
arises when a consumer who searches for the plaintiff’s website with the aid of
a search engine is directed instead to the defendant’s site because of a
similarity in the parties’ website addresses.”). However, we question whether
initial interest confusion is even relevant here. See Network Automation, Inc.
v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause
the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion,” even under
an initial interest confusion theory, “the owner of the mark must demonstrate
likely confusion, not mere diversion.”).
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examples where people, without any prompting or connection with
Defendant, will refer to the Defendant as ‘Universal Church’ by
unintentionally omitting the word ‘life’ from Defendant’s name.”).
Such “confusion” is not relevant to plaintiff’s trademark claim
because “universal church” is not being used in any way to refer
to plaintiff.30
4.

Similarity of the Trademarks

Defendants are using the same words that comprise plaintiff’s
mark.

Accordingly, this factor favors plaintiff.
5.

Proximity of the Services in the Marketplace

In considering proximity, “direct competition between the
products is not a prerequisite to relief”; at the same time
“products that share the same channel of trade are not necessarily
proximate.”

The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 963 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

This factor favors defendants.

Although both

parties are nominally churches, they offer different services.
While

plaintiff

is

a

traditional

church

offering

spiritual

In the defendants’ expert’s examples, “universal church” was used to
refer either to defendants or to the Roman Catholic notion of a universal
church. See Zibas Decl. (ECF No. 91), Ex. CC at 22 (website discussing legal
opinion that “take[s] note of the unconventional methods of becoming ordained
as a minister via the Universal Church Life Website”); id. (question posted on
a forum ndnation.com, which describes itself as “The independent voice of Notre
Dame Athletics,” asking whether, “As a Catholic, is it possible to become
ordained through some sort of universal church without renouncing my commitment
to Catholicism?”); id. at 23 (comment to an online article discussing
Representative Nancy Pelosi’s views on Catholicism where the comment refers to
Rep. Pelosi as a “self proclaimed Theologian & Doctor of the Universal Church”);
id. at 23-25 (websites identifying various wedding officiants who were ordained
by defendants but described themselves as being ordained by the “Universal
Church” or the “Universal Church of Light”).
30
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services

to

its

members,

defendant

primarily

offers

online

ordinations so that its members can perform weddings and other
religious ceremonies for non-members, something plaintiff does not
do.

See Zibas Decl., Ex. B at 67:25-68:12 (“Q Does Universal

Church offer the same services as the defendants?

A . . . I read

in their Web site that they offer some strange way to ordain people
online which is completely different than we usually do as a
church.
correct?

Q So Universal Church doesn’t offer ordinations; is that
A We don’t offer ordinations online.”).
6.

Likelihood that the Plaintiff Will “Bridge
the Gap”

“The term ‘bridging the gap’ is used to describe the senior
user’s interest in preserving avenues of expansion and entering
into

related

fields.”

C.L.A.S.S.

Promotions,

Inc.

Magazines, Inc., 753 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1985).
favors defendants.

v.

D.S.

This factor

As just noted, plaintiff does not currently

offer online ordination and there is no indication that it will do
so in the future.
7.

Defendants’ Bad Faith

“Under this factor, we look to whether the defendant adopted
its

mark

with

the

intention

of

capitalizing

on

plaintiff’s

reputation and goodwill and any confusion between his and the
senior user’s product.” The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 964 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Although we believe this factor favors

37

Case 1:14-cv-05213-NRB Document 141 Filed 08/08/17 Page 38 of 46

defendant, a reasonable juror could come out either way.

On one

hand, plaintiff does not contest defendants’ right to use the name
“Universal

Life

Church,”

and

therefore

defendants

have

a

legitimate, good faith reason to use “universal” and “church” in
their search engine optimization strategies.

Moreover, it is

difficult to imagine what benefit or motive defendants would have
to

trade

off

plaintiff’s

goodwill.31

On

the

other

hand,

a

reasonable juror could find that defendants’ use of the mark
“universal church” in various domain names, on their website, in
metadata, and in search terms, could be construed as evidence of
an

intent

to

organization.

capture

Internet

users

looking

for

plaintiff’s

Because a reasonable juror could find this factor

in either parties’ favor, we assume that it points in plaintiff’s
favor for purposes of summary judgment.
8.

Quality of Defendants’ Services

“Generally, quality is weighed as a factor when there is an
allegation that a low quality product is taking unfair advantage
of the public good will earned by a well-established high quality
product.”

Gruner + Jahr USA Pub., a Div. of Gruner + Jahr Printing

& Pub. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1993)
When asked at oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel could only suggest
that defendants were “vindictive” because they were denied their trademark
application by the USPTO. Oral Arg. Tr. (ECF No. 138) at 28:10-18. However,
this theory amounts to little more than speculation, which courts will not
consider on summary judgment. See Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12
(2d Cir. 1986) (“Nor may a party rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to
the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”).
31
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Plaintiff argues that defendants’ ordination services are
inferior because they allow anyone to become ordained online
without committing to a particular teaching or faith, without
formal education, without training, and without committing to
attend to the spiritual needs of others.
102) at 25.

On the other hand, the features that plaintiff views

disparagingly

are

customers value.

likely

defendants

the

very

features

that

defendants’

Thus, we find that defendants’ services are not

inherently inferior.
that

See Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No.

are

Moreover, there is no evidence in the record
taking

advantage

of

plaintiff’s

public

goodwill. Accordingly, we find that this factor favors defendants.
9.

Sophistication of the Relevant Public

This factor also favors defendants.

As discussed above, the

relevant public is the audience for religious worship services.
Such individuals are unlikely to confuse plaintiff’s religious
services——offered in its physical churches and through weekly
broadcasts——with defendants’ online ordination services.
10.

Conclusion

In sum, the majority of the factors point in defendants’
favor: (1) the “Universal Church” mark is weak; (2) there is little
to no evidence of actual, actionable confusion; (3) the parties’
services are not in close proximity; (4) it appears unlikely that
plaintiff will “bridge the gap”; (5) defendants’ services are not
inferior;

and

(6)

the

relevant

39

public
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sufficiently
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sophisticated so as not to be confused.

In contrast, only two

factors——the similarity of the marks and evidence of bad faith——
favor plaintiff for purposes of summary judgment.

Based on this

balance, we find that there is no likelihood of confusion as a
matter of law.

See, e.g., Medici Classics Prods., LLC v. Medici

Grp., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting
summary judgment to defendant under Polaroid where only two factors
pointed “weakly” in plaintiff’s favor).

Accordingly, we hold that

even if “Universal Church” were descriptive rather than generic,
plaintiff’s trademark infringement claims would still fail.
III. Federal Cybersquatting Claim
“To successfully assert a claim under the [Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act], a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
its

marks

were

distinctive

at

the

time

the

domain

name

was

registered; (2) the infringing domain names complained of are
identical to or confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark; and (3)
the infringer has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark.”
Webadviso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 448 Fed. App’x 95, 97 (2d Cir.
2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
Because we found that the “Universal Church” mark is generic
and

therefore

cybersquatting
“Universal

not

“distinctive,”

claim

Church”

must
were

fail
not

see
as

supra

well.

generic,

40
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However,
plaintiff’s

even

if

primary
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cybersquatting claim would still fail because the mark was not
distinctive at the time universalchurch.org was registered.
As

noted

above,

a

descriptive

mark

is

only

considered

“distinctive” if it has acquired secondary meaning, see Park ‘N
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 194, i.e., it has come through use to be
“uniquely associated with a single source,” PaperCutter, Inc. v.
Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1990).
meaning

must

be

acquired

commenced use of the mark.”

“before

[plaintiff’s]

Secondary
competitor

Id.

The primary domain name at issue, universalchurch.org was
registered by defendants in 2010, Pl.’s 56.1 (ECF No. 103) ¶ 24,
well before the “Universal Church” mark achieved incontestable
status in February 2012, id. at ¶ 5(a).
incontestable

status

is

irrelevant

to

Accordingly, the mark’s
the

mark’s

degree

distinctiveness when defendants’ registered the domain name.

of
For

the reasons set forth above——and especially in light of the long
and varied use of “universal” by churches, see supra at 17-20——we
find that “Universal Church” had not acquired secondary meaning as
referring

to

plaintiff

at

the

times

universalchurch.org

was

registered in 2010.32

32 A similar argument would apply to most of the remaining domain names,
all but two of which——universalchurch.net and theuniversalchurch.org——were
registered after February 2012. See Kent Decl. (ECF No. 95), Ex. 1 ¶¶ 84-97.
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IV.

New York Unfair Competition Claims
Because

the

standards

for

New

York

common

law

unfair

competition and trademark infringement claims are essentially the
same as under the Lanham Act, see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), we dismiss plaintiff’s New York common law claims for the
same reasons as above.
V.

New York General Business Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims under Sections 349 and 350 of the

New York General Business Law (the “NYGBL”). NYGBL § 349 prohibits
“[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business,
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this
state.”

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a).

NYGBL § 350 prohibits

“[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.”
§ 350.

Id.

“To successfully assert a claim under either section, a

plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumeroriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3)
plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive
act or practice.”

Orlander v. Staples, Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 300

(2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Although only plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its
NYGBL claims, we nevertheless grant summary judgment to defendants
and dismiss the claims because they fail as a matter of law.33
“[T]he majority view in this Circuit is that trademark or
trade dress infringement claims are not cognizable under §§ 349
and 350 of the New York General Business Law unless there is a
specific and substantial injury to the public interest over and
above ordinary trademark infringement or dilution.”

Nomination Di

Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd., No. 07
CIV.6959 (DAB), 2009 WL 4857605, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted); see also
Kaplan, Inc. v. Yun, 16 F. Supp. 3d 341, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[C]ourts in New York have routinely dismissed trademark claims
brought under Sections 349 and 350 as being outside the scope of
the statutes, because ordinary trademark disputes do not pose a
significant risk of harm to the public health or interest and are

33 “A sua sponte grant of summary judgment against the moving party is
permissible only if ‘the facts before the district court were fully developed
so that the moving party suffered no procedural prejudice’ and ‘the court is
absolutely sure that no issue of material fact exists.’” Donachie v. Liberty
Life Assur. Co. of Bos., 745 F.3d 41, 45 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bridgeway
Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration omitted).
Where the moving party has not been “denied the opportunity to place all relevant
evidence in the record,” a grant of summary judgment for the nonmoving party is
“not procedurally deficient.” Id. Here, as noted above, plaintiff conceded
that it has placed all relevant evidence in the record. See supra n.2.
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therefore not the type of deceptive conduct that the statutes were
designed to address.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).34
Here, plaintiff’s NYGBL claims are merely duplicative of its
trademark claims and therefore do not allege an injury to the
public interest “over and above” ordinary trademark infringement.
Plaintiff argues that it has alleged an injury to the public
beyond ordinary trademark confusion in that defendants’ “promotion
of their ordination services” under the “Universal Church” mark
“injures consumers ‘because they are inadvertently purchasing a
product of inferior quality, a product they do not prefer, or
both.’”

Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 102) at 28 (quoting Zip Int’l Grp.,

LLC v. Trilini Imports, Inc., No. 09-CV-2437 JG VVP, 2010 WL
648696, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010)).

Plaintiff cites two cases, George Nelson Found. v. Modernica, Inc., 12
F. Supp. 3d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and Zip Int’l Grp., LLC v. Trilini Imports,
Inc., No. 09-CV-2437 JG VVP, 2010 WL 648696 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010), reflecting
the minority position that ordinary trademark infringement allegations may be
sufficient to state claims under NYGBL §§ 349 and 350. Besides being in the
clear minority, the decisions are entitled to little weight as they fail to
recognize the majority position or even analyze whether ordinary trademark
infringement claims may be brought under Sections 349 and 350. Moreover, the
court in Zip International subsequently backed away from its position. As Judge
Gleeson recognized in a later opinion in the same case, “[s]ome courts have
held that trademark cases fall outside the scope of the New York’s consumer
protection statute, reasoning that the public harm that results from trademark
infringement is too insubstantial to satisfy the pleading requirements of § 349.
Thus, Zip’s allegations may not even be actionable under the asserted provisions
of New York law, an issue I need not address here.” Zip Int’l Grp., LLC v.
Trilini Imports, Inc., No. 09-CV-2437 JG VVP, 2011 WL 2132980, at *9 n.10
(E.D.N.Y. 2011 May 24, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted).
Accordingly, we do not believe these cases warrant rejecting the
majority position.
34

44

Case 1:14-cv-05213-NRB Document 141 Filed 08/08/17 Page 45 of 46

However, there is no evidence in the record to support these
allegations, which, frankly, we find implausible. We are confident
that defendants’ customers knew exactly what they were purchasing
when they obtained free online ordinations and were unlikely to
mistakenly believe they were ordained by plaintiff.

Moreover,

even if confusion existed, the injury is precisely the type of
injury that results from ordinary trademark confusion and does not
constitute a separate public injury.

See DO Denim, LLC v. Fried

Denim, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (assertion
that “Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s designs causes injury to the
public

because

competitive

‘the

practices

consuming
that

public

deceive

needs

and

to

be

therefore

free

from

complicate

consumers’ purchase decisions’” was “no different from the type of
‘injury’ alleged in any garden variety trade dress infringement
claim”).
Plaintiff

also

argues

from

ordinary

distinguishable

that

defendants’

trademark

conduct

infringement

is

because

defendants have been “bombarding New Yorkers searching for The
Universal

Church

online

with

advertisements

for

Defendants’

ordination services (which are not legally valid everywhere in the
State)” and “have caused significant harm to the public interest
by willfully attacking a duly registered trademark and attempting
to render it invalid, rather than challenging it through legitimate
channels.”

Pl.’s Reply MSJ (ECF No. 124) at 11-12.
45
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